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Abstract
Reciprocity considerations are important to the tax compliance problem
as they may explain the global dynamics of tax evasion, beyond individ-
ual tax evasion decisions, toward a downward or upward spiral. To provide
evidence on reciprocity in tax compliance decisions, we have conducted a lab-
oratory experiment in which we introduced two types of inequities. The first
type of inequity is called vertical, because it refers to inequities introduced
by the government when it sets different fiscal parameters for identical tax-
payers, while the second type of inequity is called horizontal because it refers
to the fact that taxpayers may differ in tax compliance decisions. In this
setting, taxpayers may react to a disadvantageous or advantageous inequity
through negative or positive reciprocal behaviors, respectively. Our results
support the existence of negative and positive reciprocity in both vertical
and horizontal cases. When both inequities come into play and may induce
reciprocal behaviors in opposite directions, the horizontal always dominates
the vertical.
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1. Introduction
The tax compliance decision has been under study since the seminal theo-
retical work of Allingham & Sandmo (1972). This work was rapidly followed
by several economic and psychological studies that underlined the relevance of
fairness considerations, in explaining tax evasion behavior (including Spicer &
Becker, 1980; Cowell, 1992; Bordignon, 1993; Falkinger, 1995; Kirchler, 2007;
Torgler, 2007). There are several sources of unfairness, caused by differences
in: tax policy parameters, levels of public goods provided or differentiated
opportunities and levels of compliance among taxpayers. These can be re-
garded as related to the two main relationships at work in the study of tax
evasion. The first relationship is between the public sector and taxpayers, as
taxation implies a compulsory contribution by individuals to public sector
funding (Alm et al., 1993a; Torgler, 2003). The second relationship is among
taxpayers, as taxation also implies a collective and fair contribution by citi-
zens to finance the government. Until now, these two relationships have been
studied separately in the literature with the aim of confirming whether un-
fairness acts as a potential factor that neutralizes feelings of guilt and pushes
taxpayers towards more evasion. Our work also addresses the consequences
of perceived unfairness on tax evasion decisions and the overall dynamics of
tax evasion.
Thus, a first wave of the literature focuses on the unfairness of the tax sys-
tem itself, which alters taxpayers’ behavior (Cowell, 1992;1 Falkinger, 1995).
This is in line with the Frey (1997) and Feld & Frey (2010) works on the
crowding out of tax compliance as a civic virtue when government policies
are perceived as unfair. In this case, initially honest taxpayers may start
evading their taxes and evaders may increase their evasion activities. The
intrinsic motivation of individuals is fueling a new line of research on ways
to explain the compliance levels observed in experiments (Alm et al., 1992).
Some studies have focused on the impact of tax rates on evasion activities,
including Fortin et al. (2007). In their experiment, some taxpayers were
taxed at a higher tax rate than the mean tax rate of their reference group,
and they concluded that this generates evasion. Other research has focused
on redistribution through the provision of public goods (Cowell & Gordon,
1988; Alm et al., 1992; Barone & Mocetti, 2011) and its impact on the per-
1Cowell (1992), due to risk aversion specifications, concludes that reducing the fairness
of the system increases honesty.
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ceived fairness and legitimacy of governments in collection taxes. Finally,
some studies linked tax morale to trust in governments and votes on tax
policies (Alm et al., 1993b; Torgler, 2003; Hug & Spo¨rri, 2011).
Nevertheless, unfairness may also arise because of some taxpayers’ deci-
sions to underreport and evade their taxes while others pay honestly. Some
earlier studies already linked taxpayers’ decisions, that is, individual deci-
sions become somehow conditional on what the others do, either in terms of
frequency or extent of evasion (see Gordon, 1989; Bordignon, 1993; Myles &
Naylor, 1996; Alm & McKee, 2004; Alm, 2012). These studies show that, un-
der strong social norms, taxpayers face a disutility from being dishonest: for
Gordon (1989), guilt in terms of disutility rises with evasion; for Bordignon
(1993), taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes decreases the more the
others evade. This may be complicated by differences in individual moral
codes, ethics and propensities to conform (Myles & Naylor, 1996; Sandmo,
2005; Frey & Torgler, 2007; Dell’Anno, 2009; Traxler, 2010). More recently,
Lefebvre et al. (2011), experimentally showed that, while examples of low
compliance tend to increase tax evasion, examples of high compliance have
no influence. Our work is in line with this research, but we study simultane-
ously vertical and horizontal relationships.
Indeed, while self-centered individuals do not care about such inequities,
reciprocally oriented individuals do and may be induced to react against
them. As argued five decades ago by Gouldner (1960), most societies en-
dorse a norm of “generalized reciprocity”, according to which individuals
should help those who have helped them and penalize those who have failed
to cooperate. From this idea, several mainly theoretical and experimental
works, were conducted to highlight both the existence and the relevance of
reciprocal behaviors (see Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2000b for an overview). This re-
search indicates the co-existence of different types of individuals and several
forms of reciprocity, the most popular of which is “strong reciprocity”. In
this case, reciprocity is seen as a conditional behavior, where, in response to
kind (unkind) actions, individuals are frequently much nicer (meaner) than
the self-interest model would predict (Gintis, 2000). Individuals are not mo-
tivated by future material payoffs; they are viewed as moral and emotional
reciprocators. One of the main field of study of reciprocal behaviors is related
to the contribution to public goods. For example, Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000a)
conducted a public goods game experiment that allowed for costly punish-
ment of free-riders. They showed that, free-riders are heavily punished even
if it is costly to and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher.
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Moreover, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment leads to a
large increase in cooperation levels. Fischbacher et al. (2001) also ran an
experiment in this vein, but used the strategy method to evaluate complete
individual strategy profiles. They found that, even if there was no oppor-
tunity for costly punishment, the contribution of individuals was positively
related to the average contribution of others, when these latter increased.
Such behaviors may be easily transposed to the tax evasion setting. For in-
stance, if a taxpayer observes that other taxpayers evade taxes, he may be
more inclined to evade as well, as to punish free-riders.
Recently, Schnellenbach (2010) provided this analysis of tax evasion through
reciprocal reactions to unfairness. He stated that, because there are at least
two potential sources of unfairness, there are symmetrically two types of reci-
procity at work: vertical as well as horizontal reciprocal reactions may occur
in the tax evasion decision. In the former case, taxpayers evade taxes to re-
taliate against a non-cooperative and unfair government. In the latter case,
one individual’s evasion increases if he or she believes that other taxpayers
also evade. Moreover, the dynamics of tax evasion towards an upward spiral
of evasion as individuals reciprocate is explained.
Our work follows that of Schnellenbach (2010), because we attempt to
test the existence, nature and relative weights of vertical and horizontal re-
ciprocal reactions in reporting decisions through a laboratory experiment.
Nevertheless, our approach differs in that we allow for disadvantageous and
advantageous inequities in both relationships, which respectively worsens or
improves a taxpayer’s perceived situation and potentially induces negative or
positive reciprocal behaviors. The intuition is that taxpayers use tax evasion
to restore fairness in any case. Our goal is to characterize the reactions of
taxpayers and to offer empirical support for reciprocal punishment or coop-
eration in each case. We also aim to detail the link between vertical and
horizontal unfairness, as we agree with Schnellenbach (2010) on: the hetero-
geneity of taxpayers’ type in the population, the intuitive role of guilt in the
tax evasion decision, and the potential rationalization and neutralization of
this feeling of guilt when tax evasion is seen as a widespread practice among
citizens. However, we also believe that guilt increases, at least for some indi-
viduals, when they perceive that very few taxpayers fail to pay their taxes.
Individually and socially, tax evasion is then seen as a morally reprehensible
practice. While theoretical studies either specify a fairness measure in the
utility function (Cowell, 1992) or introduce inequity in the amount of public
goods provided (Falkinger, 1995), we have restricted ourselves to vertical un-
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fairness arising from different tax rates to induce vertical reciprocity, in line
with Fortin et al. (2007). So we excluded redistribution from our analysis
to avoid having two potential sources of unfairness. In line with Bordignon
(1993), we decided to build the horizontal inequity scheme by providing past
exogenous information on fellow citizens’ average declaration to induce hor-
izontal reciprocity. We derive support for this study from Myles & Naylor
(1996) as we assume that the dynamics of tax evasion is fueled by social
interactions and that taxpayers shift from honesty to evasion upon crossing
a given threshold. This threshold is assumed to vary and depends on the
sensitivity of taxpayers to the unfairness. Last, note that, in this work, we
discuss neither the validity of the reciprocity approach for evasion activities,
which we take from Schnellenbach (2010), nor the kind of fairness benchmark
individuals use to make their decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the theoretical predictions of taxpayers’ decision. Section 3 exposes the ex-
perimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents the results and Section
5 provides our conclusions.
2. Reciprocity and tax compliance: Theoretical predictions
We have developed a simple analytical framework to analyze the exis-
tence of reciprocal behaviors resulting from the introduction of two types of
inequities that distort a fair situation (benchmark). We will refer to these two
inequities as vertical inequity on the one hand, and horizontal inequity on the
other, because they refer, respectively, to the vertical relationship between
taxpayers and the government or the horizontal relationship existing between
any taxpayer and his fellow citizens.2 To that sense, we follow Schnellenbach
(2010), according to whom, “If this interdependence is indeed reciprocity-
related, then some notion of fairness will be needed as a benchmark, with
2The notions of vertical inequity and horizontal inequity used in this paper should not
be confused with the concepts of vertical/ horizontal inequity given in standard public
economics textbooks. Usually, “vertical equity” is the principle that individuals with
a greater ability to pay should pay greater amount of taxes while in our work we call
vertical inequity the inequity applied to identical taxpayers but associated with the vertical
relationship since unfairness of the tax system can be attributed to the government. In
the same way, “horizontal equity” is the principle that individuals with equal ability to
pay should pay equal taxes. In our paper horizontal inequity appears ex post, due to
differences in reported income.
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deviations from the benchmark evoking negative reciprocity”, p.59. From
the benchmark case where neither vertical nor horizontal reciprocity may be
induced, we have studied three different cases: (i) the vertical case, where
only vertical reciprocity may appear; (ii) the horizontal case, where only hor-
izontal reciprocity may play a role in reporting decisions; and, lastly,(iii) the
simultaneous case of vertical and horizontal inequities where vertical and hor-
izontal reciprocities may co-exist. All theoretical predictions are determined
considering the reporting decision of taxpayer i through the maximization of
his expected utility at period t.
2.1. Benchmark
The benchmark case, by assumption, corresponds to the situation of per-
fect perceived fairness of the system. In what follows, we assume that tax
households are composed of only one taxpayer, benefiting of one and identi-
cal income level W and taxed at the same tax rate θ. We will also restrict
the set of individual fiscal characteristics to the unique real income variable.
Additionally, taxpayers have no knowledge of tax evasion activities by their
fellow citizens. Thus, the expected utility of taxpayer i at period t can be
written as:
EUB,i = (1− ρ)U(W − θXi) + ρU(W − θXi − (W −Xi)θpi) (1)
where ρ is the exogenous probability of audit, pi is the fine rate on evaded
taxes with, pi > 1, as it simultaneously captures the repayment of due taxes
and the extra burden due to the penalty, following Yitzhaki (1974). In what
follows, we assume that U is a linear utility function.
Maximizing taxpayer i’s expected utility allows us to say that:
Hypothesis 1. In the absence of obvious inequity, if pi ≥ 1
ρ
then risk-
neutral taxpayers report their income truthfully.
Nonetheless, various inequities may exist among taxpayers. Here, we
subsequently focus on vertical inequity, horizontal inequity and we combine
the two to conclude.
2.2. Vertical reciprocity
Vertical reciprocity may arise when taxpayers face an inequity generated
by the government itself. It refers to the unfairness of the tax system and
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results from differences in tax rules and fiscal parameters for identical tax-
payers. For the sake of simplification, the sole fiscal parameter that varies is
the tax rate θ. We consider only two taxpayers, each representing one group
{i, j}. The vertical inequity, denoted by φ, results from the co-existence of
two different tax rates θi and θj. This inequity may influence tax reports,
depending on the individual’s sensitivity to the unfairness of the tax system,
denoted by αi > 0. To that end, a psychological component c is introduced
to account for any perceived unfairness:
c = vi (φ) = 1 + αi(θi − θj)Xi (2)
where vi represents the motivations for vertical reciprocity. As a conse-
quence the expected utility of taxpayer i at period t becomes:
EUV I,i = (1− ρ)(W − θiXi) + ρ(W − θiXi − (W −Xi)θipi)
−(1 + αi(θi − θj)Xi) (3)
From this setting, we consider two sub-cases. Either taxpayer i is taxed
at a higher rate than taxpayer j and θi > θj; or it is the reverse and θi <
θj. In the first case, taxpayer i suffers from the inequity (disadvantageous
inequity) and may react by evading (negative vertical reciprocity) if αi is
high enough. While in the latter case, taxpayer i benefits from the lower
tax rate (advantageous inequity) that induces him to increase his reported
income (positive vertical reciprocity).3
Hypothesis 2. Disadvantageous inequity in tax rates induces negative
vertical reciprocity, while advantageous inequity in tax rates leads to positive
vertical reciprocity.
2.3. Horizontal reciprocity
Here horizontal inequity arises from differences among taxpayers due to
their different choices in terms of reported income. As a consequence, honest
taxpayers bear the tax burden when others evade. Then, assuming a fair
3Proofs are available in the Appendix 1.
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fiscal system, there is an ex post inequity between identical taxpayers. We
have considered that, in real life, taxpayers mainly have ex post information
on what others (family, friends or even colleagues) do in terms of reporting
income to the tax authorities. It is also obvious that such information is usu-
ally not precise, as evasion is an illegal activity. In most cases, it is an ex post
overall estimate of evasion activities by relatives or fellow citizens, because
there is only an approximate knowledge of the existence of past tax evasion
activities, but no idea as to the concerned amounts. As a consequence, we
assume that taxpayers are informed about the mean reporting behavior of
their fellow citizens at the previous period. They are able to observe any dif-
ference between their own reported income Xi,t−1 and the average reported
income of others within the same group X¯−i,t−1 at the end of the period. In
this context, the psychological component c takes into account the effect of
having reported a different income than the average reported income of other
group members:
c = ηi (ξ) = 1 + δi(Xi,t−1 − X¯−i,t−1)Xi,t (4)
where ξ denotes the horizontal inequity, η the motivation for horizontal
reciprocity that depends on the taxpayer’s sensitivity parameter to inequity
δi > 0. The expected utility of taxpayer i at period t can be written as
follows:
EUHI,i,t = (1− ρ)(W − θXi,t) + ρ(W − θXi,t − (W −Xi,t)θpi)
−(1 + δi(Xi,t−1 − X¯−i,t−1)Xi,t) (5)
Again, we face two symmetric cases. In the first case, taxpayer i has
reported a higher income than the average of other group members i.e.,
Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1 and inequity is thus at his disadvantage. If taxpayer i
wants to become closer to the average of his other group members, he will
decrease his reported income at period t (negative horizontal reciprocity). In
the second case, taxpayer i has reported a lower income than what his other
group members have reported on average i.e., Xi,t−1 < X¯−i,t−1 and inequity
is at his advantage. If taxpayer i wants to become closer to the average of
his other group members, he will increase his reported income at period t
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(positive horizontal reciprocity).4 As a result, the following prediction can
be made:
Hypothesis 3. Disadvantageous inequity in reported income induces
negative horizontal reciprocity, while advantageous inequity leads to positive
horizontal reciprocity.
2.4. Vertical and horizontal reciprocities
Horizontal and vertical inequities may co-exist and thus may interact. In
this case, the psychological component c that stems from both inequities is
written as follows:
c = vi (φ) + ηi (ξ) (6)
As a consequence, the overall effect depends on the type of inequities at
work (see Table 1).
[Table 1 about here.]
When inequities go in the same direction, conclusions are easy to draw. On
the one hand, inequity in tax rates is assumed to increase the evasion of tax-
payers who suffer from a disadvantageous vertical inequity (negative vertical
reciprocity). Simultaneously, differences in reported income are expected to
decrease any feelings of guilt by potential evaders who suffer from a disadvan-
tageous horizontal inequity and have the sense that some of their fellow cit-
izens evade their taxes (negative horizontal reciprocity). Both effects should
thus reinforce each other. On the other hand, taxpayers who benefit from
an advantageous vertical inequity tend to be fully honest (positive vertical
reciprocity). In addition, advantageous horizontal inequity may increase any
feelings of guilt because taxpayer i has the sense that he evades more than
his fellow citizens (positive horizontal reciprocity). Both effects should thus
reinforce each other.
Hypothesis 4. When both inequities act in the same direction, they
reinforce each other, leading to the induced reciprocal behavior.
4Proofs are available in the Appendix 1.
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But, when inequities act in opposite directions, it is impossible to draw
any conclusions on their global effect on subsequent reported income deci-
sions (see Table 1). Our experimental study aims at exploring the effects of
each type of inequity separately on income reporting decisions and to analyze
whether vertical or horizontal inequity prevails when both work simultane-
ously but in opposite directions.
3. Experimental design and procedures
3.1. Games
An experimental session consists of 3 independent games: the tax game,
the risk game and the inequity game. The main focus of this study is to
highlight the determinants of reported income when various inequities occur.
To that end, the first part of our experimental design corresponds to the
tax game. Because previous experiments have underlined that tax evasion
is related to risk aversion, we elicited our participants’ risk preferences after
the tax game using Dohmen et al. (2011)’s procedure. Finally, to analyze
to what extend individuals are sensitive to inequity, and if this sensitivity
affects reported income decisions, we also elicited pro-social preferences with
the procedure of Bartling et al. (2009).
3.1.1. The tax game
Because our focus is on tax compliance decisions, we did not introduce
redistribution through the provision of public goods financed by tax pay-
ments. So tax payments are not transferred to the taxpayers in any way.
This means that the tax game is a pure declaration game that is repeated
in different contexts characterized by different types of inequity that distort
the benchmark case of perfect perceived fairness: vertical inequity, horizontal
inequity and, both types of inequity simultaneously.
At the outset of the game, participants are presented with a screen in-
forming them of their individual income and the tax policy parameters (i.e.,
fine, audit and tax rates). Parameters are set such that they deliver the-
oretical predictions in accordance with the above hypotheses under some
restrictions regarding the parameters of sensitivity to inequities.5 More pre-
cisely, in each period, participants are provided with a constant income of
5See the Appendix 2 for details.
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X = 100 points.6 We set the fine rate at Π = 350% (i.e., participants have
to pay evaded taxes plus a penalty of 250% of unpaid taxes in the case of
an audit). Audits are assumed to be random and perfect. Audits occur with
an announced probability that is also fixed for all sessions at ρ = 1/3. We
used the same random sequence of audit to facilitate data comparisons be-
tween experimental sessions. Audits apply only to current reported income,
not to previous (or future) periods. In our experimental design, the tax rate
is the sole tax policy parameter to vary across experimental treatments to
introduce vertical inequity among taxpayers, θ = {20%; 30%; 40%}.
At the time they make their decisions, participants have to determine
the amount of income they will self-report to the tax authorities. They can
choose to report any integer amount from 0 to 100. At the end of each period,
they are informed about whether they have been audited and of their net
payoff. If the participant has an under-reported tax liability and is audited,
then a fine is imposed.
This process is repeated over 20 periods, each representing a tax year.
Participants are informed that they will be paid their after-tax earnings,
obtained in 5 out of the 20 periods, at the end of the entire experiment.
The randomly chosen periods are the same for all participants in the same
experimental session. The earned points are converted into Euros at the end
of the experiment, and the exchange rate used was 100 points=3.80 Euros.
From this setup, 6 experimental treatments were run in a between-subject
design. In each treatment, groups of 6 subjects are formed and group com-
position remains constant throughout the tax game. The first treatment
(benchmark) provides the baseline setting where all members of a group have
the same income and fiscal policy parameters and are not provided with any
kind of social information about the choices of other group members. In the
second treatment, we introduce a vertical inequity in the sense that half the
members of a group have a tax rate equal to 30%, while the others have a
tax rate of 20%. Because a tax rate equal to 30% (which is the same as
the one used in the benchmark treatment) is higher than 20%, we call this
treatment the high vertical inequity treatment (HV-I). The results obtained
from this treatment allow us to study the impact of a disadvantageous ver-
tical inequity on the reporting decisions. The third treatment is the same
as the second one, except that the tax rate of 30% is the lowest (so half
6The term points refers to the experimental currency unit.
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of group members have a tax rate equal to 30%, while the others have a
tax rate of 40%). This treatment is called low vertical inequity (LV-I) and
permits us to analyze the impact of an advantageous vertical inequity. In
the fourth treatment, we introduce another form of inequity: a horizontal
inequity. We call this treatment horizontal inequity (H-I). More precisely, at
the end of each period, when participants are informed about whether they
have been audited and of their net payoff, they also learn the average income
reported by the other members of their group. Depending on the level of
reported income and the average reported income of the other group mem-
bers, we are able to study the impact of disadvantageous and advantageous
horizontal inequities. Finally, the last two treatments mixed vertical and
horizontal inequities: the fifth treatment includes the high vertical inequity
treatment as well as additional information regarding the average income re-
ported by other group members (H-HV-I) and the sixth treatment mixes the
low vertical inequity treatment and the horizontal inequity (H-LV-I). These
last two treatments aim at examining which type of inequity (i.e., vertical or
horizontal) dominates the other when theoretical predictions are in conflict.
The used experimental treatments and parameters are reported in Table 2
while the resulting numerical thresholds of individual sensitivity towards ver-
tical and horizontal inequities for theoretical predictions to be confirmed are
exposed in the Appendix 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.1.2. The risk game
In this game, participants had to make 20 successive choices between 2
options. The first option is a safe option that varies from row to row, from
0 to 19 points, by increments of 1 point. The second option is a lottery
that remains constant: there is a 50 percent chance of winning 0 points
and a 50 percent chance of winning 30 points (see Table 7 in the Appendix
3). The switching point between the two options informs us about the risk
attitude of the participants. Risk-neutral participants should switch from the
lottery to the safe option at 15. Risk-loving participants should choose the
safe payment when the offered safe option is higher than 15, while risk-averse
participants should prefer the safe option for safe payments lower than 15. In
this way, we are able to compute individual risk preferences parameters and
subsequently see whether risk preferences and evasion decisions are related.
Regarding participants’ earnings, they are informed that, after having made
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their decisions, one of the rows will randomly be selected for payment and
that they will be paid according to their choice. The selected row is, again,
the same for all participants. In line with Dohmen et al. (2011), to ensure
incentive compatibility, participants are informed that a random device will
determine whether they are paid for this experiment. The chance of winning
was 1/8 and the exchange rate used was 3.7 points=1 Euro.
3.1.3. The inequity game
This game aims to elicit individual pro-social preferences to study whether
they affect honesty behaviors, especially in case of inequity in the level of
income reported by other group members. To that end, we follow the ex-
perimental design of Bartling et al. (2009). Subjects go through four sim-
ple binary distributional choices, affecting both their own earnings and the
earnings of another anonymously matched participant (see Table 8 in the
Appendix 4). The first two distributional choices address aversion to advan-
tageous inequity (aheadness aversion) in which participants have to choose
between egalitarian and unequal distributions that favors them. In the first
choice, choosing equal payoff implies no financial cost for the decision-maker,
contrary to the second distributional choice, which implies a decrease in his
earnings. The remaining two choices address aversion to disadvantageous in-
equity (or behindness aversion) in which participants have to choose between
egalitarian and unequal distributions that favors the anonymous partner. In
the first case, by choosing the equal distribution, the decision-maker can
decrease the payoff of the anonymous partner without incurring any cost.
Conversely, in the last distributional choice, if the participant chooses the
equal distribution, he diminishes the other’s earnings, but simultaneously
his own earnings slightly decrease. From this setting, we say that partici-
pants are aheadness averse if they consistently choose the equal distribution
in the first two choices. In the same way, they are behindness averse if they
select the egalitarian distribution in the last two distributional choices. Fi-
nally, participants who always choose the equal distribution of earnings have
egalitarian preferences. In line with Bartling et al. (2009), only one of the
four binary distributional choice is randomly selected at the end of the ex-
periment for payment and it is the same for all participants. The exchange
rate used in this game was 8 points=1 Euro.
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3.2. Participants
Our experiment was conducted at the LABEX-EM Institute (Laboratoire
d’EXperimentation en Economie et Management) at the University of Rennes
1. The experiment was computerized using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Par-
ticipants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students using the
online Recruiting System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) (Greiner,
2004). We ran two sessions per experimental treatment of the tax game,
with 24 participants per session, so that we have 4 independent observations
per session. Overall, 288 subjects participated.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each participant was randomly assigned
to a computer located in a cubicle and was not allowed to communicate with
other participants. Paper instructions relative to the first part (i.e., the tax
game) were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter.7 Once the first
game ended, the subjects took part in the risk and inequity games (the or-
der of these two games was reversed in half of the experimental sessions).
For these two games, the instructions were conveyed by a series of computer
screens that the participants read at their own pace. Clarification ques-
tions were addressed after participants completed reading the instructions
and participated in two practice exercises, before the game started. Partic-
ipants were told at the beginning of the session that (i) all responses were
anonymous, (ii) their payment would be equal to the sum of the earnings ob-
tained in the 3 games plus a show-up fee of 3 Euros and (iii) their payments
would be made in private at the end of the session. While the money-release
forms were being prepared, participants answered a questionnaire aimed at
recording individual demographic characteristics (see Table 3). Participants
who finished filling out the questionnaires signed their money-release forms
and were given their payoff. The experiment lasted 90 minutes on average,
and earnings averaged 16 Euros.
[Table 3 about here.]
7Instructions are provided in the Appendix 6.
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4. Results
4.1. Descriptive analysis
4.1.1. Self-reported income under equal tax rates and without social informa-
tion
Table 4 indicates that the average reported income over the 20 periods is
equal to 66.74 points. However, this mean conceals strong variations in the
level of reported incomes during the 20 periods, as Figure 1 shows. These
results suggest, first, that at least some taxpayers evaded taxes and, second,
that taxpayers are influenced by the results of the previous period (occurrence
of audit, ...). This is contrary to theoretical predictions based on self-material
interest and the individual rationality of risk-neutral taxpayers since the
experimental parameters should have led to a full contribution environment.8
A closer look at individual strategy profiles highlights that, overall, 48.54%
of subjects honestly reported their income (Hypothesis 1 is satisfied) while
19.58% of taxpayers were full evaders. The remainder corresponded to partial
evasion cases (i.e., self-reported income between 0 and 100 not included).
[Table 4 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
Result 1: A great heterogeneity of individual behaviors is observed from
full evasion to full honesty.
4.1.2. Self-reported income under inequity in tax rates and without social
information
Once we introduced vertical inequity, two situations had to be considered:
either taxpayers had the highest tax rate, or they had the lowest one. Looking
first at disadvantageous vertical inequity (i.e., HV-I treatment with θ =
{30%; 20%}), we naturally observed that those enjoying the 20% tax rate
reported, on average, a higher income than those having the 30% tax rate
(see Table 4; Mann-Whitney U test: z = 3.898, p = 0.0001).9 Regarding the
8The full contribution environment refers to the situation where the theoretical predic-
tion is that all taxpayers report truthfully their income.
9Because comparisons of reported income by taxpayers enjoying the lowest or the high-
est tax rates is not the purpose of this study, we do not go deeper into this issue.
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effects of inequity in tax rates on reported income by taxpayers with a 30%
tax rate, we note that the average self-reported income differed significantly
in case of disadvantageous inequity from that observed in the benchmark
treatment (Mann-Whitney U test: z = 2.225, p = 0.0261). Suffering from
the highest tax rate led to a decrease in the level of reported income while
the level of the applied tax rate per se was the same as the one used in
the benchmark treatment. A comparison of the average income reported by
taxpayers with a 30% tax rate in the LV-I treatment and the HV-I treatment
strengthens this result (Mann-Whitney U test: z = 2.998, p = 0.0029).
Benefiting from the lowest tax rate or suffering from the highest one strongly
impacts taxpayers’ reported income, although the level of the applied tax
rate was the same. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 2, according to
which, in case of disadvantageous inequity, highly sensitive taxpayers will not
report fully their income and express negative reciprocity. An examination of
individual strategy profiles revealed an increase in the proportion of evaders
(51.46% in the benchmark and 57.92% in the HV-I treatment), even if the
difference in the level of self-reported incomes in case of evasion was not
statistically significant (35.36 points and 34.27 points; Mann-Whitney U test:
z = 2.259, p = 0.7956). So, the difference in average self-reported income
between the two experimental treatments has to be mainly explained by a
decrease in the number of honest taxpayers that leads to a decrease in the
level of reported income and to an upward spiral of evasion in the long run.
Result 2: Disadvantageous inequity in tax rates leads to an increase in
the number of evaders and a subsequent decrease in the collection of taxes
in the long run.
We now turn to advantageous inequity in tax rates, that is, the LV-I treat-
ment, with θ = {30%; 40%}. As previously observed, average self-reported
income differed significantly according to the applied tax rate (see Table 4;
Mann-Whitney U test: z = 3.898, p = 0.0001). This is also confirmed by the
third panel at the top of Figure 1. If we focus on taxpayers with a 30% tax
rate, no significant difference appears between the incomes reported in the
benchmark treatment and the ones reported by taxpayers with a 30% tax
rate in the LV-I treatment (Mann-Whitney U test: z = −1.179, p = 0.2385).
In addition, a clean analysis of individual strategy profiles revealed that the
proportion of honest taxpayers increased slightly (from 48.54% to 50.21%,
see Table 4), in line with the theoretical prediction summarized in Hypoth-
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esis 2. The number of evaders, then, decreased and the level of self-reported
income in the case of evasion was also higher (35.36 points in the benchmark
treatment and 39.83 points in the LV-I treatment with θ = 30%; Mann-
Whitney U test: z = −1.665, p = 0.0960). Benefiting from the lowest tax
rate does not induce most taxpayers to truthfully report their income. It only
induces evaders to self-report higher income compared to the decisions made
by evaders in the benchmark treatment. One can conclude that at least some
taxpayers manifest a form of positive reciprocity. So, it seems that having
a lower tax rate than some other group members leads some taxpayers to
greater honesty while still not reporting their entire income. In the long run,
this advantageous inequity in tax rates may allow the tax authority to collect
more taxes.
Result 3: Advantageous vertical inequity does not induce a strong in-
crease in fully honest behaviors but does decrease the level of evasion, which
facilitates the collection of taxes in the long run.
4.1.3. Self-reported income under equal tax rates and with social information
Looking at horizontal inequity, taxpayers learn the average reported in-
come of other group members X¯−i,t−1 at the end of the period t − 1. It
results that, depending on the average level of reported income, some tax-
payers may suffer from inequity (Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1) while others may benefit
from it (Xi,t−1 < X¯−i,t−1). Therefore, we examine whether taxpayers consider
the average reported income of other group members at period t − 1 when
making their current decision. For instance, do taxpayers adjust their next
reported income up or down to come closer to the average income reported
by other group members at the previous period? Note that the informa-
tion displayed to taxpayers did not permit them to determine the individual
choices of the 5 other members of their group and only provided an aggregate
approximation of what other group members did. In this setting, even if the
average reported income did not differ significantly from that observed in
the benchmark treatment (see Table 4; Mann-Whitney U test: z = 0.359,
p = 0.7198), less extreme behaviors (full evasion or full honesty) were ob-
served. This could suggest that taxpayers adjust their next reported incomes
depending on the average reported income of other group members, without
being fully honest or dishonest. Examination of individual strategy profiles
revealed that, when the reported income was above other group members’
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average reported income (60.73% of situations), 55.40% of the next reported
incomes decreased. Conversely, when the reported income was below other
group members’ average reported income (38.85% of situations), 79.08% of
the next reported income increased. The direction of adjustment depended
on whether taxpayers were above or below the average reported income by
other group members, while the strength of such an adjustment may depend
on pro-social preferences. To go deeper into this issue, we used the type of
preferences elicited from the inequity game experiment. This game allowed
us to characterize taxpayers as behindness averse, aheadness averse, egalitar-
ian or other, if their decisions corresponded to none of the previous individual
strategies. The results obtained in the inequity game highlight that, among
the subjects pool of the H-I treatment, most taxpayers (87.5%) expressed
aheadness aversion, 18.75% expressed behindness aversion, 12.5% had egali-
tarian preferences and 6.25% made choices that were not in accordance with
any of these three strategies (see Table 5). From that, we computed the
Spearman rank correlation coefficients to highlight both the direction and
the strength of the correlation between the reported income at period t and
the average reported income of other group members at period t− 1. From
the results reported in Table 5, as expected, both for taxpayers who expressed
aheadness and behindness aversions, when they reported an income higher
than the average of reported income by other group members, their reported
income decreased significantly at the next period. In the same way, when
they reported an income lower than the average of reported income by other
group members, their reported income increased significantly at the next pe-
riod. Such behavior is perfectly in line with Hypothesis 3, which describes
negative reciprocal behaviors in case of disadvantageous inequity in reported
incomes and positive reciprocal behaviors in case of advantageous inequity
in reported incomes. A lower variability in reported incomes across the 20
periods, compared to the benchmark treatment, ensued (see Figure 1).
[Table 5 about here.]
Result 4: Some taxpayers consider the average self-reported income of
their group to choose the income they will report in the current period.
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4.1.4. Self-reported income under inequity in tax rates and with social infor-
mation
Finally, we looked at reported incomes when both vertical and horizon-
tal inequities simultaneously occurred. From this setting, we first examined
the case of horizontal and disadvantageous vertical inequities (i.e., H-HV-I
treatment with θ equal to 30% or 20%). Table 4 shows that average income
reported by taxpayers with a 30% tax rate was higher than that reported in
the H-I and the HV-I treatments for taxpayers with the 30% tax rate (Mann-
Whitney U tests: z = −7.801, p < 0.0001 and z = −6.550, p < 0.0001
respectively). The following explains this result: at the end of each period,
taxpayers learn the average of other group members’ reported incomes, which
included decisions made by both taxpayers with a 30% tax rate and those
with a 20% tax rate. As we have previously seen, taxpayers with the low-
est tax rate usually reported a higher income than others. This led to a
higher average reported income compared to the H-I treatment, in which all
taxpayers have a 30% tax rate. By considering such information during the
decision-making process, taxpayers who were sensitive to the average of other
group members’ reported incomes tended to increase how much the income
they report. If several taxpayers in the group act in this way, this will once
again lead to an increase in the average reported income, and so on. This
reasoning causes higher average reported incomes than those observed in the
H-I and HV-I treatments. Figure 2 confirms that, except in few periods, the
average reported incomes by taxpayers with a 30% tax rate were higher in
case of disadvantageous inequity in tax rates than without inequity. Again,
individual strategy profiles strengthen this result. As reported on Table 4,
we note a larger proportion of honest taxpayers and a lower proportion of full
evaders. Moreover, when the reported income was above other group mem-
bers’ average reported incomes (64.16% of situations), both inequities were
at the disadvantage of taxpayers. In this case, 43.51% of the next reported
incomes were smaller, which corroborates the negative reciprocity assumed
in Hypothesis 4. Even if less than half of taxpayers decreases the level of
their next reported income, it is important to note that only 9.42% of the
next reported incomes increased. Conversely, when taxpayers reported an
income lower than the other group members’ average, inequity in tax rates
should lead to negative reciprocity while social information should induce
positive reciprocity. In this case (32.29% of situations), 75.48% of the next
decisions consisted of a higher level of reported income, i.e., positive recipro-
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cal behaviors. One can conclude that, even if taxpayers suffer from a higher
tax rate than some of the other taxpayers in their group, this does not induce
them to evade. Conversely, they are more sensitive to the average income
reported by other group members and try to come closer to it despite the
fact that they have different tax rates. It follows that, horizontal inequity
prevails and the effect of having a different tax rate vanishes. Finally, the
correlation between the current reported income and the average reported
income of other group members in the previous period corroborates both the
direction of the adjustment and the strength of the relationship between the
two (see Table 5).
The symmetric result is observed in case of advantageous inequity in tax
rates (i.e., H-LV-I treatment with θ equal to 30% or 40%). Table 4 shows
that the average income reported by taxpayers with a 30% tax rate is, at
first sight, strangely low when compared to that observed in the H-I or in
the LV-I treatments with a 30% tax rate (Mann-Whitney U tests: z = 6.515,
p < 0.0001 and z = 4.557, p < 0.0001 respectively). To explain this finding,
the previous argument holds: taxpayers with a 30% tax rate benefit from
a lower tax rate than some of the other taxpayers in their group who have
a 40% tax rate. In this case, the average reported income is lower due to
the lower honesty of taxpayers with the 40% tax rate at the beginning of
the game. This small average reported income induces taxpayers to decrease
the next income they report compared to the H-I treatment, in which all
taxpayers have a 30% tax rate. By considering such information during the
decision-making process, taxpayers who are sensitive to the average of other
group members’ reported income tend to decrease the income they report.
If several taxpayers in the group act in this way, this leads once again to a
decrease in the average reported income, and so on. This reasoning leads
to lower average reported incomes than those observed in the H-I and LV-I
treatments (see Figure 2). Such adjustments are corroborated by the study of
individual reported incomes. When reported income was below other group
members’ average (41.66% of situations), we had both an advantageous in-
equity in tax rates and an advantageous horizontal inequity. In this case,
70% of the next reported incomes were higher which confirms our theoreti-
cal predictions (Hypothesis 4 of an increase in reported income when both
inequities are at the advantage of taxpayer i). Conversely, when inequities
worked in opposite direction (i.e., when reported income was above the other
group members’ average), the inequity in tax rates should lead to an in-
crease in reported income (positive reciprocity) while the horizontal inequity
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should induce a decrease (negative reciprocity). This occurred in 57.29%
of situations, and we note that 53.09% of next reported incomes decreased
while only 15.27% increased. Once again, this result suggests that horizontal
inequity prevails. Our argument is also supported by the analysis of individ-
ual strategy profiles. As reported in Table 4, we note a lower proportion of
honest taxpayers as well as a larger proportion of full evaders. This result
suggests that taxpayers are more sensitive to other taxpayers’ decisions than
to differences in tax rates. Indeed, even if they benefit from an advantageous
inequity in tax rates, the behavior of other taxpayers induces them to lower
their next reported income, so they can come closer to the others, and re-
moves the effect of vertical inequity. Such adjustments are supported by the
computation of Spearman rank correlation coefficients between current re-
ported income (Xi,t) and average reported incomes by other group members
in the previous period X¯−i,t−1 (see Table 5).
[Figure 2 about here.]
Result 5: When inequities work in the same direction, the corresponding
reciprocal behavior prevails. Conversely, when inequities may induce recipro-
cal behaviors in opposite directions, the horizontal inequity always dominates
the vertical one.
4.2. Determinants of self-reported income
To provide more detailed results on the determinants of self-reported
income, we conducted some econometric analyses. We decided to use a dy-
namic panel regression model for three reasons. First, from data observa-
tion, we noticed that taxpayers vary considerably in their reported income
choices. Second, taxpayers change their reported income from period to pe-
riod. Third, taxpayers’ decisions may be affected by other group members’
average reported income in previous periods, when such information is avail-
able. Dynamic panel data analysis, following Arellano & Bond (1991) and
Blundell & Bond (1998) seems therefore to be the most accurate method
here. The proposed Generalized Method of Moments procedure is particu-
larly designed for situations with few periods and many individuals. It allows
us to control for independent variables that are potentially correlated with
past and possibly current realizations of the error, with fixed effect, het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals. Thus, we specified
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a dynamic panel regression model for Xi,t, that is taxpayer’s i self-reported
income in period t, which was modeled as depending on a number of observ-
able explanatory variables, a specific group fixed-effect ωi,j, time fixed-effects
ζt and an error term composed of a specific taxpayer fixed-effect, µi and an
unobserved component i,t, as detailed in equation 7:
Xi,t = β0 +
3∑
p=1
βiXi,t−p + ψiθi +
3∑
p=1
λi(|Xi,t−p − X¯−i,t−p|)
+
3∑
p=1
γi(Auditt−p) + τ ′Zi,t + ωi,j + ζt + µi + i,t (7)
with X¯−i,t−p the lagged value of the observed average income reported by
other group members from periods p to t. When information about the av-
erage of other group members’ reported income was provided, we conducted
separate regressions for reported income above or below the other group
members’ average. This formalization allowed us to separately study dis-
advantageous and advantageous horizontal inequities. The lagged values of
individual reported incomes, average of the reported incomes of other group
members and audits, were introduced to allow the model to capture the
smoothness observed in the individual-subject reported income dynamics. θi
is the value of the tax rate applied to taxpayer i (i.e., 20%, 30% or 40%).
Finally, Zi,t is a set of independent variables that allows us to control for
socio-demographics characteristics (such as age, gender, risk attitudes and
pro-social preferences). Results are reported in Table 6.
[Table 6 about here.]
We first looked at inequity in tax rates (i.e., columns 1 and 2). After
having controlled for past reported incomes and audits, the level of tax rate
remains a strong and negative determinant of reported income that corrob-
orates our previous findings. We also note that having been audited has a
negative and persistent effect on reported income. This means that, after
having been audited, taxpayers believe that they will not be audited in the
next periods and take the risk of reducing the level of the income they report
to increase their after-tax income (bomb crater effect). Of course, the after-
tax income is increased only if such taxpayers are not audited. Looking at the
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inequity in reported incomes among the group (horizontal inequity; columns
3 and 4) the negative and persistent effect of audits is also observed. More
interestingly, if a taxpayer has reported an income larger than the average of
other group members, this negatively and significantly impacts the level of
the current reported income (negative horizontal reciprocity; Hypothesis 3).
Conversely, if a taxpayer learns that he has been less honest than the aver-
age of other group members, he significantly increases his current reported
income (positive horizontal reciprocity; Hypothesis 3). In both cases, the
current reported income aims to come closer to the previous average of the
reported income of other group members. Moreover, taxpayers only consider
the average of income reported by other group members at the previous pe-
riod (i.e., t− 1). A long and persistent effect of this social information is not
observed. Finally, reported estimates do not allow us to conclude whether
being above the other group members’ average has a stronger impact than
being below it. Considering both vertical and horizontal inequities (i.e., from
columns 5 to 8), we first note that the level of the tax rate no longer has a
significant effect on reported income, which confirms our previous results ac-
cording to which horizontal inequity dominates vertical inequity. This result
can be explained by a convergence of taxpayer’s decisions towards the mean.
This argument holds only if taxpayers whose previous decisions are above
other group members’ average decrease the level of the next income they
will report. Symmetrically, if the income they have reported is below other
group members’ average, they will report a higher income in the next period.
These conditions of adjustment are confirmed by significant estimates both
in the case of a disadvantageous tax rate (i.e., H-HV-I treatment; columns 5
and 6) and an advantageous tax rate (i.e., H-LV-I treatment; columns 7 and
8). However, a clear difference between these two settings has to be noted.
In case of a disadvantageous inequity in tax rate, the difference in reported
income has a significant and persistent effect on next reported income. This
is all the more true for taxpayers who have reported a larger income than
other group members’ average. This result can be explained by the theoret-
ical predictions established from the impact of both vertical and horizontal
inequities. Indeed, we have seen that, when both inequities go in the same
direction (i.e., both disadvantageous or both advantageous; columns 5 and 8)
this may induce the same reciprocal behavior (i.e., negative or positive reci-
procity). In this case, one can note that the effect of a difference between the
reported income Xi and the average reported income by other group mem-
bers X¯−i is stronger and more persistent than when inequities go in opposite
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directions (i.e., one disadvantageous and the other advantageous; columns 6
and 7). Hypothesis 4 is satisfied. All of these findings confirm that horizontal
inequity dominates vertical inequity. Overall, socio-demographic characteris-
tics and risk preferences rarely impact taxpayer’s decisions.10 While the fact
that pro-social preferences do not explain the level of reported income can be
stunning at first sight, an explanation may be found from results reported in
Table 5. Indeed, we observe that, in the current period, most taxpayers tend
to adjust their reported income to match the previous average reported in-
come of other group members, regardless of the type of pro-social preferences.
This could suggest that the type of pro-social preferences inferred from the
Bartling et al. (2009)’s procedure does not allow for a thin enough grid of
pro-social preferences to highlight potentially different behaviors depending
to the type of preferences and subsequent reactions to inequities.
5. Conclusion
In this experiment, we have analyzed whether vertical or horizontal in-
equity impacts reported income decisions, and whether they lead to reciprocal
behaviors as stated by Schnellenbach (2010). We first found that disadvanta-
geous inequity in tax rates leads to a decrease in the level of reported income
while an advantageous inequity decreases the level of evasion. Second, when
social information is provided, i.e., when taxpayers learn the average re-
ported income of their other group members at the end of the period, most
of them adjust their current reported income up or down to come closer to
the previous reported mean. This occurs, regardless of whether the income
they reported was above or below the mean. Finally, when the two types
of inequities occur at the same time and go in the same direction, the effect
of social information is very pronounced and persistent. Negative reciprocal
behaviors can explain the spread of evasion in the case of disadvantageous
inequities. Alternatively, in the case of advantageous inequities, this can be
an explanation of a long trend of honest behavior. Conversely, when both
inequities go in opposite directions, the horizontal inequity dominates the
vertical one and leads to the corresponding reciprocal behavior. Here, an
important point should be underlined in terms of the size of our groups.
Whereas, intuitively, in small groups, it is clear that individual evasion ac-
tivity matters directly to the rest of the group since it visibly modifies the
10Figure 3 in the Appendix 5 provides an overview of individuals risk preferences.
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collective outcome, one could question if the same occurs in large societies.
But we do believe that our results could be useful in societies where tax
evasion is commonly presented as a widespread practice. For instance in the
French and Italian cases, it is common knowledge either that tax evasion
is a “national sport” or at least that is generalized.11 In such cases, some
conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, any communication on the
extent of evasion and tax savings to be obtained from additional deterrent
efforts may have the perverse effect to induce initially honest taxpayers to
evade. Second, any communication on the equity of the system, jointly with
any measures strengthening tax moral, for instance good examples of morally
orientated taxpayers, could increase taxes collected in the long run.
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Appendix 1 – Proofs of theoretical predictions
Vertical reciprocity
Vertical reciprocity may occur in case of difference in tax rates (i.e., ver-
tical inequity). The following psychological component accounts for this
inequity:
c = vi (φ) = 1 + αi(θi − θj)Xi (8)
In this context, taxpayer i will choose Xi to maximize his expected utility
at period t:
EUV I,i = (1− ρ)(W − θiXi) + ρ(W − θiXi − (W −Xi)θipi)
−(1 + αi(θi − θj)Xi) (9)
Assuming first that taxpayer i faces a higher tax rate than taxpayer j,
θi > θj. Because θi > θj, then (8) represents the psychological cost related
to the difference in tax rates. It is straightforward to show that:
1. ∂vi(φ)
∂φ
> 0: When the difference in tax rates increases, (φ), the related
cost vi (φ) and the disutility for taxpayer i also increase.
2. ∂vi(φ)
∂Xi
> 0: The cost borne by taxpayer i, vi (φ), increases along with
the income he reports.
As a consequence, when taxpayer i suffers from the inequity, he will under-
report his income to maximize his expected utility (9) if his sensitivity to the
inequity is high enough, i.e.,
αi >
(−1 + piρ)θi
θi − θj (10)
From this threshold, the more sensitive the taxpayer i is to difference in
tax rates the more the taxpayer i suffers from the inequity and decreases
the level of reported income to express his discontent or anger towards the
government (negative vertical reciprocity).
Symmetrically, when taxpayer i has a lower tax rate than taxpayer j, he
benefits from an advantageous inequity in tax rates. In his expected utility
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function (9), vi (φ) appears as a gain arising from the inequity. It results the
following behavioral patterns:
1. ∂vi(φ)
∂φ
> 0: When the difference in tax rates increases, (φ), the related
gain vi (φ) as well as the expected utility of taxpayer i increase.
2. ∂vi(φ)
∂Xi
> 0: The gain in utility rises along with reported income.
As a consequence, when taxpayer i benefits from the inequity, he will
honestly declare his income to maximize his expected utility (9). This result
holds for ∀αi > 0 (positive vertical reciprocity).
Horizontal reciprocity
Horizontal reciprocity may be expressed when inequity is due to differ-
ence in reported incomes between taxpayer i and the average of other group
members (i.e., horizontal inequity). The following psychological component
accounts for this inequity:
c = ηi (ξ) = 1 + δi(Xi,t−1 − X¯−i,t−1)Xi,t (11)
In this context, taxpayer i will choose Xi to maximize his expected utility
at period t:
EUHI,i,t = (1− ρ)(W − θXi,t) + ρ(W − θXi,t − (W −Xi,t)θpi)
−(1 + δi(Xi,t−1 − X¯−i,t−1)Xi,t) (12)
Assuming first that taxpayer i has reported an income higher than his
other group members on average, i.e., Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1. Taxpayer i suf-
fers from this inequity measured through the psychological cost (11). It is
straightforward to show that:
1. ∂ηi(ξ)
∂ξ
> 0: When the difference between taxpayer i’s reporting decision
at period t − 1 and the average reported income of his other group
members at the same period increases, ξ, taxpayer i’s related cost,ηi (ξ),
and disutility, increase.
2. ∂ηi(ξ)
∂Xi,t
> 0: The psychological cost, ηi (ξ), is increasing along with re-
ported income.
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As a consequence, when taxpayer i suffers from the inequity, at the next
period he will under-report his income to maximize his expected utility (12)
and to come closer to his group average, if his sensitivity to the inequity is
high enough, i.e.,
δi >
(−1 + piρ)θ
Xi,t−1 − X¯−i,t−1 (13)
From this threshold, the more sensitive taxpayer i is to differences in re-
ported incomes with the average of other group members, the more the tax-
payer i suffers from the inequity and decreases the level of his next reported
income (negative horizontal reciprocity). So, in case of disadvantageous in-
equity, taxpayer i decides to evade to minimize his psychological cost and
to diminish the gap with the average decision of his other group members
observed at the previous period.
Let us turn now to the case where taxpayer i has reported a lower income
than the average of his other group members, i.e., Xi,t−1 < X¯−i,t−1. Here he
benefits from an advantageous inequity in terms of reported income measured
by (11). It follows that:
1. ∂ηi(ξ)
∂ξ
> 0: When the difference between taxpayer i’s reported income
and the average reported income of his other group members increases,
ξ, taxpayer i’s related gain, ηi (ξ), and his utility increase.
2. ∂ηi(ξ)
∂Xi,t
> 0: The gain in utility rises along with reported income.
As a consequence, when taxpayer i benefits from the inequity, he will
increase his next reported income to maximize his expected utility (12) and
to come closer to his group average (positive horizontal reciprocity). This
result holds for ∀δi > 0.
Appendix 2 – Theoretical predictions from numerical simulations
Here, we detail the way the parameters of the experiment were chosen. In
order to observe reciprocal reactions in the tax game, we need as a benchmark
a full contribution environment. To that end, we decided to set an initial
income W = 100 for all subjects and groups of 6 participants to allow for
an audit probability ρ = 1
3
in line with the literature. As a consequence, the
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fine rate needed to be above than 300%. We chose pi = 350%. Finally, we
decided to set θ = 30% to allow for realistic variations in tax rates.
Vertical reciprocity
In the case of vertical inequity, taxpayer i maximizes his expected utility
function (9). From that, we first assume that taxpayer i has a higher tax
rate than taxpayer j in his group (i.e., disadvantageous vertical inequity,
HV-I treatment). In this case, we set θi = 30% and θj = 20%.
The maximization of the expected utility function (9) that corresponds
to fully honest behavior in the absence of inequity and full evasion behavior
in the case of a disadvantageous inequity (i.e., negative vertical reciprocity)
requires that the following condition be respected:
pi <
θi + αiθi − αiθj
ρθi
(14)
Given our numerical parameters, it follows that fully honest behaviors in
the benchmark treatment and full evasion behaviors in the HV-I treatment
will be observed if:
αi >
(−1 + piρ)θi
θi − θj
αi > 0.5 (15)
Symmetrically, in case of advantageous vertical inequity (i.e., LV-I treat-
ment), we set θi = 30% and θj = 40%. It results that the maximization of
the expected utility function (9) leading to fully honest behavior, both in the
absence of inequity and in the case of an advantageous inequity (i.e., positive
vertical reciprocity), implies:
pi >
θi + αiθi − αiθj
ρθi
(16)
With our numerical values, we obtain:
αi > −0.5 (17)
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Horizontal reciprocity
In case of horizontal inequity, all taxpayers have the same tax rate θ =
30%. Taxpayer i maximizes his expected utility function (12). To determine
the numerical values of δi that lead to an increase or decrease in reported
income, we needed to set numerical values for Xi,t−1 and X¯−i,t−1. We ar-
bitrarily set Xi,t−1 = 100 and X¯−i,t−1 = 50 in the case of disadvantageous
horizontal inequity and the reverse in the case of advantageous horizontal
inequity. It is noteworthy that various other numerical simulations have
been conducted and lead to few variations in the value of δi to obtain the
behavioral predictions that follow.
From now on, we first assume that taxpayer i has reported a higher income
than the average of his group i.e., Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1. The maximization of his
utility function (12) corresponds to fully honest behavior in the absence of
inequity and full evasion behavior in the case of disadvantageous inequity
(i.e., negative horizontal behavior) if:
pi <
θ + δiXi,t−1 − δiX¯−i,t−1
ρθ
(18)
Given our numerical parameters, we obtain:
δi >
(−1 + piρ)θ
Xi,t−1 − X¯−i,t−1
δi > 0.001 (19)
Symmetrically, if taxpayer i has reported an income smaller than the av-
erage of his other group members, the fully honest behavior observed both in
the benchmark treatment and in the case of advantageous horizontal inequity
(i.e., positive horizontal reciprocity) is noticed if:
pi >
θ + δiXi,t−1 − δiX¯−i,t−1
ρθ
(20)
With the used numerical values, the behavioral prediction of fully honest
behavior in the two settings is observed if:
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δi > −0.001 (21)
Vertical and horizontal inequities
When both horizontal and vertical inequities exist at the same time, some
behavioral patterns are easy to predict while others are the result of opposite
incentives. 4 conceivable situations are possible:
1. Disadvantageous vertical inequity and disadvantageous horizontal in-
equity: The former leads to full evasion behavior if αi > 0.5 and the
latter leads to full evasion behavior if δi > 0.001. It follows that, if
αi > 0.5 and δi > 0.001, then full evasion behavior (and so negative
reciprocity) will be observed.
2. Advantageous vertical inequity and advantageous horizontal inequity:
The former leads to fully honest behavior if αi > −0.5 and the lat-
ter leads to fully honest behavior if δi > −0.001. It follows that, if
αi > −0.5 and δi > −0.001, then fully honest behavior (and so pos-
itive reciprocity) will be observed. This is always true since we have
supposed that α > 0 and δ > 0.
3. Disadvantageous vertical inequity and advantageous horizontal inequity:
While the first inequity leads to full evasion behavior, the second in-
duces taxpayers to increase the amount of income they report. So the
two inequities imply reciprocal behaviors in opposite directions and no
clear behavioral pattern may be predicted thereafter.
4. Advantageous vertical inequity and disadvantageous horizontal inequity:
While the first inequity leads to fully honest behavior, the second in-
duces taxpayers to decrease the amount of income they report. Again
no clear behavioral pattern may be predicted here.
Appendix 3 – Decisions sheet for the risk game experiment
[Table 7 about here.]
Appendix 4 – Decisions sheet for the inequity game experiment
[Table 8 about here.]
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Appendix 5 – Decisions in the risk game
[Figure 3 about here.]
Appendix 6 – Instructions for the tax game experiment
The experiment in which you are about to take part aims at studying how
individuals make their decisions. If you carefully read these instructions, you
will have the opportunity to leave with a non-negligible amount of money.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate. If you violate
this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment and you will not be
paid. If you have questions, raise your hand and we will come to answer
you in private. All your answer will be treated anonymously and will be
collected through the computer network. You will indicate your choices on
the computer you are seated in front of, and the computer will inform you
about your earnings in experimental points. The sum you will earn during
the experiment will be paid by check at the end of the experiment, following
the conversion rule: 38 Points = 1 Euro. We will add a participation fee of
3 Euros to this earned amount.
1. General framework of the experiment
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to a group of
6 people, randomly chosen among the 24 people present in the room.
Group composition will remain unchanged until the end of the experi-
ment. You will thus always interact with the same 5 other people. This
experiment is composed of 20 identical periods.
2. Schedule of one period
Each period is composed of three steps.
Step 1: Income report
At the beginning of each period, you will be given an income of 100
points. This income is the same for all participants in the experiment
and will be identical among periods. Once you learn your income, you
will have to report it. You are free to report what you want using a
whole number between 0 and 100. You can report 0, 1, 2, ..., 98, 99
up to 100 points. A screen will summarize the different information
available to help you to make your decision, as shown below:
[Figure 4 about here.]
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Step 2: Deduction and control
• Deduction on reported income: The reported income in step 1 will
be subject to a deduction. The amount deducted is calculated as
follows:
Deduction on reported income = (reported income x rate of
deduction)
The deduction rate is the same for all participants and for all of
the 20 periods, i.e. 30% (0,3). This way, if you declare 100 points,
30 points will be deducted (100 x 0,3 = 30).
[HV-I: The deduction rate can take two values: Half of the group
members (3 people out of 6) will face a 30% (0,3) rate, and the
second half (the 3 remaining members) will face a 20% (0,2) rate.
Each individual will face the same rate for the 20 periods.] [LV-I:
The deduction rate can take two values: Half of the group members
(3 people out of 6) will face a 30% (0,3) rate, and the second
half (the 3 remaining members) will face a 40% (0,4) rate. Each
individual will face the same rate for the 20 periods.]
• Control of reported income and penalty: At the end of step 1,
the computer controls the reported income of some participants.
More precisely, 2 people from each group are randomly drawn by
the computer to be controlled. This control aims at comparing
initial and reported incomes. So:
– If you are controlled and you have reported an income lower
than your initial income, a penalty will be charged. This
penalty is calculated as follows:
Penalty = (initial income - reported income) x deduction
rate x penalty rate
The penalty rate is the same for all participants and all peri-
ods. It is equal to 350% (3,5).
– If you are controlled and you have reported totally your initial
income, you will not be charged any penalty.
– If you are not controlled, no penalty will be charged.
• Calculus of earnings of the period: In each period, your earnings
are calculated as follows:
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Earnings = initial income - (reported income x deduction rate) -
potential penalty
Step 3 : History
At the end of each period, you will be reminded about the following:
your initial income, reported income, whether you have been audited,
potentially paid penalties and your earnings at the end of this period
[H-I and the average reported income of the other members of your
group]. You are not able to learn decisions made by others or their
earnings. In the same way, others are unable to learn your decisions
and earnings. In addition, you cannot learn choices or gains of other
groups. This history is presented as follows:
[Figure 5 about here.]
After reading this information, a new period, identical on all points,
will start and you will interact with the same people.
Payment: 5 of the 20 periods will be randomly chosen at the end of the
experiment for payment and will be the same for all participants. We
will sum the earnings over the 5 periods, plus the 3 Euros participation
fee.
3. Examples
• Example 1: You have an income of 100 points and the deduction
rate is 0,3. If you decide to fully report the 100 points, your
earnings are:
– 100 (your income) - 0,3 x 100 (deducted amount) = 70 points
if you are not controlled.
– 100 (your income) - 0,3 x 100 (deducted amount) = 70 points
if you are controlled. The penalty is effectively not charged
because you have totally reported your income.
• Example 2: You have an income of 100 points and the deduction
rate is 0,3. If you decide to report half of your income, i.e., 50
points, yours earnings are:
– 100 (your income) - 0,3 x 50 (amount deducted) = 100 - 15
= 85 points if you are not controlled.
– 100 (your income) - 0,3 x 50 (deducted amount) - (100 - 50)
x 0,3 x 3,5 (penalty) = 100 - 15 - 52,5 = 32,5 points if you
are controlled.
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Figure 1: Average reported income per experimental treatment
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Figure 2: Average reported income by taxpayers with a 30% tax rate under
social information
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Figure 3: Overview of decisions in the risk game per experimental treatment
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Figure 4: First computer screen for tax game experiment
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Figure 5: Second computer screen for the tax game experiment
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Table 1: Theoretical predictions
Type of inequity Theoretical predictions for taxpayer i at period t
Vertical
θi > θj Full evasion ; Negative reciprocity
θi < θj Full honesty ; Positive reciprocity
Horizontal
Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1 Decrease in reported income ; Negative reciprocity
Xi,t−1 < X¯−i,t−1 Increase in reported income ; Positive reciprocity
Both Vertical & Horizontal
θi > θj & Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1 Full evasion ; Negative reciprocity
θi > θj & Xi,t−1 < X¯−i,t−1 Indeterminate
θi < θj & Xi,t−1 > X¯−i,t−1 Indeterminate
θi < θj & Xi,t−1 < X¯−i,t−1 Full honesty ; Positive reciprocity
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Table 2: Summary of parameters per experimental treatment
Treatments Income Tax rates Audit Fine Social
information
Benchmark 100 30% 1/3 350% Not provided
HV-I 100 30% – 20% 1/3 350% Not provided
LV-I 100 30% – 40% 1/3 350% Not provided
H-I 100 30% 1/3 350% Provided
H-HV-I 100 30% – 20% 1/3 350% Provided
H-LV-I 100 30% – 40% 1/3 350% Provided
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Table 3: Average sample statistics of our subjects pool
Frequency
Age
18 and less 36.46
19 31.60
20 20.14
21 and more 11.80
Gender
Men 50.00
Women 50.00
Level of studies
First year 55.21
Higher degree 44.79
Discipline
Economics 68.75
Other 31.25
Job activities
Yes 15.97
No 84.03
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Table 4: Descriptives statistics per experimental treatment
Treatments Subjects N Mean reported income % of fully honest % of full evaders
Benchmark 960 66.74 (41.29) 48.54 19.58
HV-I
All 960 66.37 (41.89) 49.16 20.00
With 30% tax rate 480 61.93 (42.60) 42.08 22.08
With 20% tax rate 480 70.81 (40.74) 56.25 17.92
LV-I
All 960 64.65 (40.96) 44.48 18.02
With 30% tax rate 480 70.04 (39.58) 50.21 16.04
With 40% tax rate 480 59.27 (41.63) 38.75 20.00
H-I 960 66.99 (39.25) 42.29 15.62
H-HV-I
All 960 73.32 (39.44) 57.39 14.48
With 30% tax rate 480 73.86 (38.40) 55.83 13.75
With 20% tax rate 480 72.78 (40.51) 58.96 15.21
H-LV-I
All 960 60.64 (42.19) 39.17 20.73
With 30% tax rate 480 61.51 (42.39) 38.54 20.00
With 40% tax rate 480 59.78 (42.02) 39.79 21.46
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 7: The 21 decisions in the risk game experiment
Situations Option A Choose Option B
Right or Left
Situation 1 0 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 2 1 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 3 2 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 4 3 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 5 4 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 6 5 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 7 6 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 8 7 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 9 8 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 10 9 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 11 10 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 12 11 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 13 12 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 14 13 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 15 14 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 16 15 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 17 16 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 18 17 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 19 18 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
Situation 20 19 50% to get 0 and 50% to get 30
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Table 8: The 4 situations in the inequity game
Situations Distribution A Choose Distribution B
Your payoff Other’s payoff Right or Left Your payoff Other’s payoff
Situation 1 10 10 10 6
Situation 2 10 10 16 4
Situation 3 10 10 10 18
Situation 4 10 10 11 19
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